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What to expect from the 2017 yellow fever outbreak in Brazil?
São Paulo, February 3, 2017
Dear Editor
In the early beginning of January 2017, the Brazilian Ministry of Health notified 
the World Health Organization (WHO) about an increasing number of confirmed 
cases of yellow fever in the State of Minas Gerais, Southeastern Brazil. Since then, an 
apparent expansion of the transmission area and an increasing number of suspected 
and confirmed cases have been reported. Regarding this epidemiological context, 
there are emerging questions that could explain this apparently unexpected scenario 
and what to expect about the recent yellow fever outbreak in Brazil.
In Brazil, between 1980 and 2004, 662 cases of sylvatic yellow fever (YF), most 
of them sporadic, were confirmed with a case fatality rate of 51%1. In the outbreaks 
that occurred in the country between 2000 and 2009, an increased viral circulation 
was observed towards the Eastern and Southern areas of the country, and the virus 
was identified in areas that were silent for several decades2. 
The epidemiological series of confirmed human cases of sylvatic yellow fever 
in Brazil present an irregular epidemiological pattern of occurrence marked by 
endemic transmission, interspersed by epizootic and/ or epidemic periods when 
the virus mainly affects populations with low vaccination coverage usually in the 
Central-Western, Southeast and South regions of Brazil, as occurred in the last 
epidemic period between 2008 and 20093-5. 
This time, the epicenter is in the State of Minas Gerais where yellow fever was 
quite common until the 1930’s. After that, vector control programs associated with 
vaccination mass campaigns, as observed in other Brazilian States, interrupted 
the urban transmission cycle. Since then no cases/ outbreaks of the sylvatic cycle 
were observed until 2002, when an outbreak occurred in a region close to the now 
affected area in 20173. Unlike the previous one, which was restricted to two or three 
municipalities, this time there are suspect cases in more than 90 municipalities, and 
an apparent expansion of the transmission areas6. 
The recent 2000’s outbreaks in Brazil have followed a similar pattern: 
simultaneous small outbreaks popping out in quite extensive areas. In 2008-
2009 there were cases in the States of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul (around 
1,000 km apart), and eventually reached Asunción, in Paraguay, where “urban” 
transmission was established (though the spread was contained, with 20 some 
cases)7,8. Unfortunately, the epidemiological data on this outbreak are no longer 
available at the Ministry of Health official sources1.
In the current outbreak, affected municipalities are spread within Minas Gerais 
State. Most of them are located close to the State’s borders - at East with the 
neighboring States of Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo, in the Doce river basin 
and São Paulo State in the South border. 
So far, the Ministry of Health has classified all cases as “sylvatic”, and apparently, 
there are no cases of transmission in the urban areas, although this distinction might 
be difficult in very small towns/ municipalities where the cases are occurring and 
where, year by year, Aedes aegypti infestation and epidemic dengue transmission 
have been observed in most of them9. 
Historically, changes and expansion of transmission risk areas have been 
observed within the national territory, followed by new definitions of the areas in 
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which the vaccine is recommended (1998 and redefinition 
in 2003)10. In October 2008, there was a new delimitation of 
these areas, as shown in Figure 1: an area where the vaccine 
is recommended corresponding to the area where the risk 
of transmission is recognized, and an area without vaccine 
recommendation, corresponding to the “indene areas”, with 
no evidence of viral circulation11. 
The routine yellow fever vaccination is recommended for 
the most of the Brazilian territory, but it leaves out the largest 
metropolitan regions of the country, located to the East, where 
the demographic density is the highest, and the majority of the 
Brazilian population lives. Based on the fact that for sylvatic 
yellow fever it is considered that there is no herd immunity 
and non-vaccinated individuals are considered susceptible to 
the disease, to reach not only individual protection but also 
to contain viral dissemination, it is mandatory to maintain 
high rates of vaccine coverage in the resident population. 
Vaccination is also strongly recommended to everyone who is 
planning to enter the forest or rural areas (for work, tourism, 
or recreation purposes) to avoid transmission in a sylvatic 
cycle maintained by Haemagoggus and Sabethes mosquitoes 
and non-human primates12. Although the Ministry of Health 
has this recommendation on routine vaccination against 
yellow fever and recognizes the importance of this as a 
prevention (and control) strategy, it does not seem to us that 
a careful and regular monitoring of the yellow fever coverage 
rates and effective actions to reach and maintain this target 
are occurring13,14 (Figure 2).
The plurality of Brazilian ecosystems, climatic 
conditions, urbanization processes, high population 
mobility across the country, and the recent economic crisis 
and its impact on infrastructure, vector control and other 
public health programs, have probably played a role in the 
response capacity to the current outbreak. These factors, 
and not just epidemiological drivers should be considered 
as reasons for the large dengue epidemics, the recent 
introduction of Zika and chikungunya viruses and also the 
current sylvatic yellow fever outbreak and a possible urban 
transmission of this virus15,16. 
The yellow fever epidemics must be considered as a 
real challenge to the public health authorities not only in 
the local level, but also from an international perspective. 
An example of this was the recent yellow fever epidemic 
in African countries in 2016, when robust efforts of WHO 
and partners were needed to support local governments 
to control the outbreak, to strengthen measures to prevent 
new cases, and to avoid its spread to other countries. There 
were essential strategies focused on surveillance and risk 
assessment, vaccination, case management, vector control, 
social mobilization and risk communication17, and they 
won! “The outbreak, which was first detected in Angola in 
December 2015, had caused 962 confirmed cases of yellow 
fever across the two countries (884 in Angola 78 in DRC) by 
16 November 2016, with more than 7,300 suspected cases. 
The last confirmed case reported in Angola was on 23 June 
and DRC’s last case was on 12 July”18.
Based on Angola recent challenge and experience, 
it is mandatory to ask: are the adopted actions until this 
Figure 1 - Area with and without recommendation of yellow 
fever vaccine, Brazil. Source: Guide to Health Surveillance11
Figure 2 - Distribution of vaccination coverage (%) against yellow fever, by Brazilian region, 1994-2017. Source: National Immunization 
Program. Data update: October 19, 2016. Data accessed January 29, 2017.
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moment by the Brazilian Ministry of Health and the States 
strong, opportune, coordinated, agile enough to control and, 
more, to prevent a catastrophic scenario, the yellow fever 
re-urbanization?19. 
The present epidemiological event must be understood 
as a serious epidemiological emergency and not a routine 
challenge. This critical situation can be demonstrated by the 
last Ministry of Health epidemiological update of February 
the 2nd, when 901 suspected cases were reported, of which 
708 (78.6%) cases and 60.1% of the deaths remained under 
investigation. An expansion of the area with suspected 
cases was observed, encompassing 5 States and 97 
municipalities6. Just two States (São Paulo and the Distrito 
Federal) are presenting a timely information regarding the 
confirmation of cases. Minas Gerais, responsible for more 
than 90% of suspect cases presented just 20% of final 
diagnosis. This is a serious problem. The timely diagnosis 
is essential for the management of the outbreak because it 
would allow to prioritizing the locations and populations 
where transmission is actually occurring for vaccination 
and vector control measures if deemed necessary.
Another critical issue that limited a better comprehension 
of outbreak progression was the classification of cases 
adopted during the first two weeks of the year by the Minas 
Gerais State Health Secretariat (SES-MG), which included 
“probable cases” of YF and “preliminary laboratory tests”20. 
None of these categories had been used before during YF 
outbreaks, and they do not appear in the “Guide to Health 
Surveillance”, the guideline published by the Ministry of 
Health that contains the proceedings and recommendations 
for public health surveillance in Brazil11. These categories 
have disappeared since the January the 19th YF bulletin, but 
it seems that the so-called “probable cases” were re-located 
to the “suspect” group, without any consistent explanation. 
The Ministry of Health and the SES-MG still owe a 
more clear and convincing explanation to the medical 
and scientific communities, as to the population, on what 
happened, including why there was a significant proportion 
of non-vaccinated population and if vaccine supply is really 
enough in face of an eventual scenario of urban transmission 
cycle. There are rumors that the confirmation of YF cases 
using serologic diagnosis has been dropped because of the 
possibility of cross-reactivity with Zika virus antibodies21,22. 
It seems also that the network of public health laboratories 
of the Brazilian States is not being capable to provide a 
timely response to the outbreak. 
Additionally, the epidemiological bulletins that were 
disclosed are very poor regarding the outbreak description, 
the epidemiological information and control measures5. 
Instead of publicizing the number of vaccine doses 
distributed to the States, the focus should shift to the actually 
administered vaccine doses and updates of the vaccine 
coverage not only in the municipalities with confirmed 
cases, but also in their vulnerable neighbors. More than 
publicizing the number of doses of vaccine distributed and 
the crude number of notified, confirmed and discharged 
cases, there is a need for the monitoring of operational 
and epidemiological indicators, the early suspicion and 
notification, the time to start a blocking vaccination and 
vector control in a new transmission focus. 
Without consistent epidemiological data, including 
virological surveillance, many questions will still remain 
unanswered: are yellow fever cases and deaths again the 
result of seasonality and the cyclical pattern of the illness 
in Brazil? Is it the natural history of the disease to be 
blamed? Is the population to be blamed because they did 
not get the vaccine? Did health authorities fail to observe 
the low vaccination coverage? Does our obsolete, passive, 
overloaded and inopportune surveillance system reflect 
the characteristics of the prevention and control measures 
applied for the various vaccine-preventable diseases and 
their outbreaks that pop up in Brazil? Finally, what can the 
country, the continent, the world, expect from the 2017 
Brazilian yellow fever outbreak? Will 2017 be the year of 
the re-urbanization of YF after more than seven decades?
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